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Suitability Standards: A New Look at
Economic Theory and Current SEC
Disclosure Policy

JANET E. KERR*

Brokers perform valuable services for the individual investor and
the financial community. Their services range from the counseling
of clients with respect to investment opportunities, to efficiently trans-

acting buy and sell orders. Because of their utility, brokers are relied
on extensively by the investing public. Such reliance ultimately leads
to the need for some type of scrutiny into the activities carried on
by this group of market participants in order to insure that their conduct is suitable.
The attention of this article first is turned to reviewing possible
standards and guidelines by which brokers can be reviewed.' This
necessitates a discussion of suitability rules in terms of not only traditional legal guidelines, but also current economic thought, notably
portfolio theory and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis as
possible standards of review.
Additionally, attention is given to the conflicts that may arise
between the current disclosure policy as formulated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the SEC or the Commission) and
economic theory as it pertains to suitability. This article attempts to
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; J.D. Pepperdine,
1978; LL.M., New York University 1979.
1. "Broker" as used in this article also refers to broker-dealers, but does not refer to
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resolve these conflicts while formulating sound suitability standards
based on current market reality.
CURRENT LEGAL APPROACHES

A.

TO INVESTMENT DECISIONS

State Laws

Traditional legal guidelines for the investment of securities by market
representatives such as brokers has been influenced greatly by the law
of trusts as well as other laws. 2 Existing law in this area basically
prohibits certain acts and provides somewhat vague guidelines for
investment decisions.
In general, the Second Restatement of Trusts and the Second
Restatement of Agency, as applied to brokers, provide that they should
invest prudently3 and should not speculate.' Additionally, they should
diversify the investment portfolio' and sell off assets unsuitable for
7
an account. 6 Overall, they should make the portfolio productive.
In those jurisdictions relying on this approach, it is understood that
despite these specific guidelines, the overriding standard for a broker's
performance in the handling of a client's accounts is one of a duty
to exercise the ordinary skill and care normally possessed by others
in the profession 8 and to invest prudently.9 This is known as the
prudent-man approach and has developed from a mixture of tort,
agency, and trust law. This approach promotes conservative investing.' 0
Some jurisdictions take a different legal approach to proper investment techniques that further inhibits the exercise of a broker's judgment by forbidding him to enter into certain investments that are likely
to depreciate. These statutes are known as legal lists and it is usually
a per se violation to invest in these securities.1 '
investment advisors or other market representatives.
2. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal
Doctrine, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 721, 722-23 (1976).
3.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TRUSTS §227 (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF AGENCY

§425 (1958).
4. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §425 comment c (1958).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §228 (1959); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §425 comment c (1958).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §230 (1959); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §425(C) (1958).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §181 (1959); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §425(a) comment b (1958).
8.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §299A (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§379 (1958).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §379 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§227 (1959).
10. Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARv. L. REv. 603, 617 (1970).
11. Some states have a combined legal list-prudent man statute. See, e.g., N.Y. EST.,
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The common thread of both the prudent-man and legal list approach
is the protection of the investor against an unnecessary risk of loss. 2
This basic policy is based on the assumption that the customer is
basically "risk-adverse."' 3 In accordance with this, the goal of both
legal approaches is to minimize the possibility that an investor will
suffer loss when he sells his investment for less than the amount of
its purchase.' 4 Both approaches, however, are flawed.
B.

Problems with Current State Regulations

The problem with both methods is three-fold. First, efforts to
minimize risks under both methods have gone too far. Risk minimization leads to return minimization-the more conservative the investment, the lower the return.'" It would be erroneous to believe that
all investors at all times would prefer to avoid risk at the expense
of experiencing higher returns. The risk-of-loss-at-all-costs posture
promoted by the legal approach is not in alignment with the desires'"
of all investors.
A second problem caused by both legal approaches is their failure
to measure risk reduction realistically. If risk of loss is the primary
concern of these statutes, then adequate methods should be developed
to ascertain whether in fact the risk level is appropriate for the particular investor. Unfortunately, when courts have applied these legal
approaches, they have judged the broker's ability to reduce risk based
on his success or failure to minimize the risk of each individual security
in an investor's portfolio, instead of the risk of the portfolio as a
whole. ' I
The problem with this approach is that the focus on individual
securities ignores the fact that the risk of an entire portfolio cannot
be measured by the risk-levels of its individual securities. Different
securities in a portfolio may perform in the same way or covary on

POWERS & TRUST LAW §11-2.2 (McKinney 1967).
12. See Note, supra note 10, at 616.
13. Pozen, Money Managers and SecuritiesResearch, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 923, 929 (1976);
see also LoREE & BREALEY, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 364 (2d ed.

1978).
14. See Note, supra note 10, at 616.
15. LoRm & BREALEY, supra note 13, at 364.
16. In contrast to legal approaches, economic theory assumes that investors often are willing to take greater risks in the hope of receiving higher returns. See Cohen, The Suitability
Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604, 1609 (1971).
17. See Note, supra note 10, at 617.
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the happening of certain contingencies.' 8 Therefore, the risk of a
security cannot be judged on an individual level because its risk or
risk-free nature will be interdependent upon the other types of securities
collected in the portfolio and their covariance. Hence, the concern
should not be with the anticipated risk of each security, but with
the effect on the risk level of the entire portfolio with the acquisition
of each new security.
The third criticism that may be posited against current legal
approaches is that they are inappropriate in insuring return maximization. As stated previously, investors also are concerned with returns
as well as risk. However, current statutes only ensure risk minimization. A broker may be adjudicated prudent without exercising any
efforts on his part to ensure that the investor reaps the highest return
for his money invested. A broker who does not try to enhance return
is as guilty of failing a client as when he neglects to reduce risk. In
both instances the investor is hurt, yet current legal approaches only
recognize one type of harm.
In summary, state law has based legal concepts not only on
unrealistic assumptions as to the needs and concerns of an' investor,
but also has promoted irrational and inept methods of dealing with
these assumptions. Besides being impractical in their application, an
attitude of vagueness and uncertainty has pervaded the interpretation
of state legal approaches. This particularly has been true of the
prudent-man rule.' 9 The prudent-man rule is subject to various types
of applications due to the fact that the judgment of various courts
will differ as to what is prudent. Therefore, it is virtually impossible
for both the courts and brokers to know what constitutes the current
state of the law. Problems also abound under the suitability doctrines
promulgated by national securities associations, stock exchanges, and
the SEC.
C. Regulation by the NYSE, NASD and SEC
Apart from state laws, the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the SEC, have
attempted to regulate broker activities by promulgating suitability
rules or guidelines.2" The suitability doctrine guidelines originated as

18. Id; see generally Sharpe, A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analyses, 9 MoMT. Sci
277 (1963).

19.

See Bines, supra note 2. at 726-27.

20. Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, §2, CCH NASD Manual
2152; Rule 405, CCH
N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide
2405; and, former SEC Rule 15bi0-3. Former Rule 15b10-3 was
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a response to high-pressure "broiler-room" sales techniques used by
some brokers. 2 ' Broiler-room operations were designed to influence
prospective investors in making hasty decisions to buy stock in new
security issues without providing them the time to consider whether
the investment was advisable in light of their particular financial
capacity. Whatever information was given about the security or
securities was usually vague, incorrect or inaccurate. In these circumstances, investors often fell victim to such pressure tactics and
found themselves financially worse off than before.
As a result of these harmful practices, reform was forthcoming in
the embodiment of the suitability doctrine, which, as stated previously,
was developed by the SEC, the NASD, and impliedly by the NYSE.
The SEC suitability doctrine formerly was embodied in Rule 15b10-3.
This rule, however, recently was rescinded by the SEC. 2 The SEC,
in its formulation of this suitability rule, had the ordinary investor
as its target for protection. The rule required that the broker not
only affirmatively ascertain the essential facts relevant to the customer's
financial status and investment objectives, but also required that any
recommendation by the broker be suitable and in accordance with
the information obtained. 23
Those brokers who were not members of the NASD were covered
by the SEC suitability rule. The rule stated:
Every nonmember broker or dealer and every associated person who
recommends to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any
enacted under the SEC SECO (SEC-registered only) program, which empowered the SEC to
issue regulations governing registered brokers who were not members of a national securities
association such as the NASD. The purpose of these rules was to promote just and equitable
principles of trade.
21. Bines, supra note 2, at 725 n.20. Judge Friendly provides the best description of a
typical broiler-room operation:
The process would begin by sending to persons on various occupational lists, "such
as doctors, plumbers, anything you want," which Kimball owned or would purchase,
"teaser letters" describing the bright financial future afforded by low-priced stocks.
These were followed by sales literature touting some particular stock. Next would
come a telephone call from a salesman called an "opener," who "would try and
sell the prospect as much as or as little as he could." This would be followed by
more mail relating to the "good news about the company," and then by the knockout blow, a call from a "high-pressure salesman," colorfully characterized as a loader
who would "try and increase the purchase of the stock."
United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61, 64 (2nd Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963).
22. See generally SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20409, [1983-84 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,457 at 86,415 (1983). This release formally eliminates direct
regulation by the SEC of broker-dealers previously governed by the SEC SECO rules. As a
result, one of the rules that was rescinded was the SEC suitability rule embodied in Rule 15b10-3.
Any broker-dealer engaged in an over-the-counter securities business now must join a registered
securities association. The release was effective December 6, 1983. Id.
23. See generally SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8136 [1966-67 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,459 at 82,890 (1967).
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security shall have reasonable grounds to believe that the recommendation is not unsuitable for the customer on the basis of information furnished by such customer after reasonable inquiry concerning
the customer's investment objectives, financial situation and needs,
and any other information known by such broker or dealer or
associated person.2"
In comparison, the suitability guidelines of the NASD and NYSE
are not as broad. The NASD suitability provision provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of
any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing
that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis
of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security
holdings and as to financial situation and needs.25
Unlike the SEC suitability rule, the NASD does not impose upon the
broker an affirmative duty to investigate the client's financial status,
but only requires that any recommendation that the broker make be
suitable, based upon such information that the client voluntary
discloses .26
The NYSE Rule 405,27 otherwise known as the Know-YourCustomer rule, together with the NYSE fair dealing provisions found
in Rule 401,28 have been interpreted by many as imposing some kind
of implied suitability obligation,2 9 even though Rule 405 originally
was instituted for the protection of its own firms from the irresponsibility of customers. 3" Rule 405 states:
Every member organization is required..

.

to ...

[u]se due diligence

to learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every order,
every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such organization and every person holding power of attorney over any account
accepted or carried by such organization. 3 '

24. Former SEC Rule 15biO-3.
25. N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) §2152, art. III (Rules of Fair Practice), §2.
26. National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), Special Report to NASD Members
1964, at 8 (1965); Mundheim, ProfessionalResponsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability
Doctrine, 1965 DuKE L.J. 445, 458; see also 1 SEC, Report of Special Study of Security Markets,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 311-12 (1963).
27. Rule 405, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2405.
28. Id. at 2401.
29. See Roach II, The Suitability Obligations of Brokers; Present Law and the Proposed
FederalSecurities Code, 29 HAsTiNGs L.J. 1067, 1079-80 (1978); see also Nicholas, The Broker's
Duty to His Customer Under Evolving FederalFiduciaryand Suitability Standards, 26 BUssM.o
L. REv. 435, 436 (1977); Soto & Bowen, The Proposed Suitability Standardsfor the Commodity Industry: "Right Church Wrong Pew," 53 Cm. KENT. L. REV. 289, 302 n.41 (1976).
30. SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 290-323, 315-29 (1963); see also 6 L.
Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION at 3715-16 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
31. Rule 405, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2405.
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Rule 401 provides:
Every member, allied member and member organization shall at all

times adhere to the principles of good
business practice in the con32
duct of his or its business affairs.
The NYSE suitability obligations have been interpreted to require
brokers not only to investigate the financial status and objectives of
the investor, but also to recommend a suitable investment in accordance
with the obtained information. 3 These duties, however, may apply
only in situations where the client wishes to purchase speculative
securities.34
A comparison of the suitability guidelines of the NYSE, NASD,
and SEC indicates that the SEC suitability rule was the most farreaching of the three. With the investor as its primary concern, the
SEC suitability doctrine had regarded the handling of customer
accounts as an investment activity which should be subject to
regulation.3 Besides recognizing the need for suitability guidelines,
the SEC, pursuant to its anti-fraud provisions, had provided that if
there were an unsuitable recommendation or sale of speculative
securities, as well as nonspeculative securities, to investors who could
not bear the risk, a violation was found which would most probably
result in stringent remedial procedures.3 6 Brokers who violate the current NASD and NYSE suitability provision also may be subject to
disciplinary action.37 The suitability doctrine of the NYSE and NASD,
however, also is flawed.
D.

Problems with Regulation by the NYSE and NASD

The problems with regulating investment decisions through the
suitability doctrine as formulated by the NASD and NYSE are twofold.
First, neither the38NASD nor the NYSE has stated explicity what
"suitable" means. Instead, certain guidelines have evolved, primarily
pursuant to case law in the federal securities law area, that have served
to direct brokers in the making of recommendations and investment
decisions. Pursuant to prior case law, a broker has been held to a

32.

Id. at

2401.

33. N.Y.S.E Supervision and Management of Registered Representatives and Customer
Accounts at 7-8 (1973 ed.).
34. Id. at 7.

35.

Bines, supra note 2, at 725.

36.
37.
38.

Id; see also Hecht v. Harris, Upham and Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209-11 (9th Cir. 1970).
For example, see Article XIV, §6 of the N.Y.S.E Construction.
Cohen, supra note 16, at 1606; see also Roach II, supra note 29, at 1136.
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duty to inquire about the customer's financial condition under certain circumstances.39 Also, it has been said that for a recommendation to be suitable, it must meet the investor's needs, objectives, and
financial capacity. 0 Additionally, if the risk of the customer's desired
investment would exceed his capacity to bear it, then it is the broker's
duty to inform him of such."' Furthermore, the practice of churning, as
it is known, has been considered to be per se unsuitable. 42
Absent a churning violation, a suitable recommendation seems to
be contingent largely on the broker's ability to match the recommendation to the client. Whether or not the broker has done so is judged
by his success or failure in exercising diligence and prudence in the
questioned transactions. 3 These are the same standards that have been
applied by state laws. Therefore, the suitability of a recommendation
for the most part depends on the application of amorphous legal standards which are applied on a case-by-case basis. 4"The second problem
with the suitability guidelines promulgated by the NASD and NYSE
is that their primary intent is to minimize the possibility of excessively
risky recommendations. 45 Their emphasis on the reduction of risk is
greatly reflective of the state legal approaches, and therefore is subject to all the same criticisms. Since these suitability guidelines are
focused on risk-averseness, methods for increasing returns go unnoticed
or unused and, therefore, have not become a part of any suitability
standard used by the NYSE or NASD. Thus, even though the investor
may be assured that his investment risk is comparable to his financial capacity, he may not hold his broker to a duty of choosing an
investment which reaps the highest return for that level of risk.46
Because of the inherent problems in the legal approach to the
suitability doctrine, it is necessary to focus on a different approach
which will give suitability a new meaning and provide concrete
39. Note, Broker Investment Recommendations and the Efficient CapitalMarket Hypothesis:
A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 1077, 1086 (1977).
40. Mundheim, supra note 25, at 447-48; Salmanowitz, supra note 39, at 1086; see, e.g.,
Phillips & Co., 37 S.E.C. 66, 70 (1958); Eugene J. Erdos, SEC Release No. 34-20376 (1983).
41. Richard N. Cea, SEC Release No. 34-8662 (August 6, 1969); see also Powers v. Francis
I. Dupont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211 (9th
Cir. 1969).
42. Roach II, supra note 29, at 1030-33. Churning is defined as the unnecessary and excessive
trading by a broker of securities in a client's account when done to increase brokerage commissions without any intention of economically benefiting the client. See e.g., Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 1970).
43. Note, supra note 39, at 1086.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. If portfolio theory is adopted as a standard of suitability, such a duty would be imposed. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
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guidelines for future investment decisions. Hence, there is a movement towards defining suitability in terms of economic theory based
on modern portfolio theory and the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis (the ECMH) in order to provide the broker with definite
approaches for making investment decisions which are more in line
with the customer's desire for increased returns.
MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY

Economists through the years have developed what is known as
portfolio theory. 7 Portfolio theory attempts to standardize a method
for brokers to follow in recommending suitable investments.48
Generally, this theory propounds that every investment features two
elements: these elements are referred to as expected return and risk. 9
The expected return of a portfolio generally is defined as the weighted
average of all the expected returns of its component securities." Risk,
on the other hand, most commonly is considered to be the average
amount of variation among all possible returns from an investment.'
Expected return is further broken down into two components. The
first is known as a risk-free component which equals the rate of return
on risk-free investments and rewards the investor for deferring the
use of his funds. 2 The second is known as a risk component which
compensates the investor for reconciling himself to the possibility of
variation in his anticipated return. 3
The two elements-risk and expected return-may be condensed
into a single number, which serves to calculate the return per unit
of risk. 4 Generally, risk and return are considered to be positively

47.

Portfolio theory is highly technical and complex. This article attempts to highlight

only the more important concepts of the theory. For more information regarding this theory,
see Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (Mar. 1952); Tobin, Liquidity Preference As
Behavior Toward Risk, 25 REv. EcoN. SruD. 65 (1958); W. SHaRPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND
CAPITAL MARKETS (1970); see also J. LoRm & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEoRsES
AND EVIDENCE 10-14 (1973); LoRm & BREALEY, supra note 13; Bines, supra note 2.
48. Roach II, supra note 29, at 1158-59.
49. Pozen, supra note 13, at 929.
50. SHARPE, supra note 47, at 42. "The actual return on a portfolio is the weighted average
of the actual returns on its component securities, using the proportions invested as weights." Id.
51. Pozen, supra note 13, at 929; see also Modigliani & Pogue, An Introduction to Risk
and Return, FIN. ANALYsTs J. March-April 1974 at 68, 70, and May-June 1974 at 69; Bower
& Wippern, Risk-Return Measurement in Portfolio Selection and PerformanceModels: Progress
Report, 4 J. FIN. & QuANTITATIE ANALYsis 417 (1969); Langbein & Posner, Market Funds
and Trust Investment Law, 1976 AM. Bus. FouND. RESEARCH J. 1, 7-8.
52. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1608.
53. Id.
54. Id.To find out how this is computed, see LNTNER, A MODEL OF A PERFECTLY FuNCTIONING SECURITIES MARKET, ECONOIC PoLIcy AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SEcurrIEs,

at 127, (H. Manne ed. 1969).
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correlated. 5 In accordance with this, low risk or risk-free securities,
such as United States Savings Bonds and insured savings accounts,
will have a low return.16 An investment with a high risk, like speculative
stock, usually has a high return." To compute a securities return per
unit of risk with accuracy, one need only subtract the risk-free rate
of return from the expected rate of return of the investment, then
divide by the degree of risk affiliated with that security. 8
The basic underlying assumption of portfolio theory is that investors
are generally risk-adverse.5 9 Accordingly, the greater the risk, the
greater are the desires and expectations on the part of investor for
more rewarding returns.60 The primary objective of a broker using
portfolio theory, therefore, is the development of a portfolio which
will yield the highest return per unit of risk selected, or otherwise
stated, the lowest risk for any given return.6
To achieve this objective, two possible avenues of procedure have
been pursued. One approach directs the broker to find undervalued
stocks with higher returns than stocks of the same risk level and include
these in the portfolio.62 The second approach tries to meet the above
objective through diversification by decreasing the aggregate risks of
the portfolio without lowering the average returns. 3 Thus, the difference in methods is that one focuses on the prediction of returns,
while the other is concerned with the reduction of aggregate risk in
the portfolio.
For any approach to be of significant value in predicting both the
expected return and investment risk, it must be reliable. Studies have
shown that the second procedure is more effective and reliable than

55. See generally LoEm & HAMILTON, supra note 47, at 99; Modigliani & Pogue, An
Introduction to Risk and Return, FIN. ANALYSTS J. 69, 77-82, 84-85 (May-June 1974).
56. H. LATANt, D. TUTTLa & C. JONES, SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAOEMENT, at 35 (2d ed. 1975).
57. Lopm & BREALEY, supra note 13, at 364.
58. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1608. See generally LINTNER, supra note 54.
59. J. COHEN, E. ZINBA.G & A. ZEIKMEL, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAOEMENT,

60.
61.

at 739 (1973).
Id.
This is known as the best or optimal portfolio. Since the needs of an investor may

vary from time to time, the best or optimal portfolio may need to be adjusted to meet the
investor's immediate desires. Adjustment can be accomplished through borrowing, which increases
the risk level, or through investing some funds in risk-free assets, which decreases the risk

level. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 1609-10; see also Sharpe, Adjusting for Risk in Portfolio
Performance Measurement, in LoRm & BREALEY, supra note 13, at 442; Pozen, supra note
13, at 930; C. GRANGER & 0. MORGENSTERN, THE PREDICTABILITY OF STOCK MARKET PRICES,
at 9-12 (1970); R. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS,
at 115- 22 (1969).
62. R. HAGIN & C. MADER, THE NEW SCIENCE OF INVESTING, at 97-106 (1973).
63. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
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the first and should be used to further the objective of portfolio
theory." Both procedures, however, will be discussed below and each
will be defined relevant to its significance to the portfolio objective
of maximized return for each level of risk.
Today many brokers purchase research which is designed to detect
undervalued stocks with higher returns than stocks at the same risk
level. The method of finding potential undervalued stocks may be
made by technical or fundamental analysis." Technical analysis provides information on prices based on the underlying assumption that
investors expect certain buying and selling patterns to repeat themselves
with some degree of reliability and regularity."6 Therefore, technical
analysts scrutinize the historical data on prices and the volume of
stock trading in order to discover repeating patterns for individual
securities or for the stock market as a whole. This is done in an attempt
to predict future price movement.6 7 Empirical studies have shown,
though, that fluctuations in securities prices statistically are unrelated
to past securities prices and, instead, are random." In general, there
seems to be no significant predictable relationship between securities
prices, the direction of price movements, and trading volumes.6 9
Fundamental analysts believe that the performance of a company
impacts upon the price of its securities. 7 The basis for this belief
is grounded in well-known studies which have shown that future
changes in stock prices covary with future changes in corporate
earnings." Fundamental analysts believe, therefore, that if future
earnings can be predicted, then so can future stock prices.
In predicting the performance of a company, fundamental analysts
attempt to predict future securities prices by examining the historical

64. Pozen, supra note 13, at 930; see also Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review
of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
65. See generally Ehrbor, Technical Analysis Refuses to Die, 42 FORTUNE 99 (Aug. 1975);
Fama, supra note 64, at 388-413; Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. Bus.
U. Chi. 34 (1965); Fama & Blune, Filter Rules and Stock Market Trading, 39 J. Bus. 226,
238-40 (1966); B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SEcUERy ANALYsIs: PRINCIPLES AND
TECmNQUE at 24-35 (4th ed. 1962); McQuown, Technical and Fundamental Analysis and Capital
Market Theory, J. BANK RESEARCH, (Spring 1973); Shaw, Technical Analysis, in S. LEVINE,
FINANCIAL ANALYST'S HANDBOOK 944 (1975).
66. Bines, supra note 2, at 789-90; see also Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices,
21 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 55 Sept.-Oct. (1965).
67. COHEN, ZINBARG & ZEIKEL, supra note 59, at 514.
68. HAGEN & MADER, supra note 62, at 97-106; see also Black, Implications of the Random
Walk Hypothesis for Portfolio Management, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 16 (Mar.-Apr. 1971); B.
LEV, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS: A NEW APPROACH, at 219 (1974).
69. See Pozen, supra note 13, at 931.
70. Bines, supra note 2, at 786.
71. BREAiEY, supra note 61, at 66-81.
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data on corporate earnings. 2 The primary problem with fundamental analysis is that future changes in corporate earnings seldom relate
to past records of corporate earnings. Any future prediction, therefore,
has been characterized by randomness.73 Fundamental analysts have
attempted to inject their theory with new credibility by stating that
their theory may be reliable if analysts can make new interpretations
of existing corporate earnings data or can discover new information
about the earning potential of a company.74 This prospect is essentially unrealistic, however, due to the fact that few analysts have been
gifted enough to do either of the above with any kind of regularity
or reliability. 75 Viewing the rarity of success that fundamental analysis
has experienced along with its generally expensive transaction costs,
efforts directed toward this method of research, as well as technical
analysis, should be discouraged.
In summary, methods of research which are oriented towards
increasing an investment's expected return through finding undervalued
securities are basically unreliable and inadequate.7 6 These research
methods, therefore, should not be used in conjunction with portfolio
theory in the formulation of any kind of suitability standard.
To adequately use portfolio theory brokers should try to focus on
the reduction of risk in trying to obtain the greatest expected return
available at a client's particular risk level. 77 In reducing risk, portfolio theory does not concentrate solely on the nature of the investor's
risky assets. Instead, the theory looks to the entire degree of risk
incurred by the investor's total portfolio.78
Diversification is a proven method for the reduction of risk. 79
Diversification has been found to decrease the aggregate risk of a
portfolio without generally decreasing the aggregate returns.80 It is,
therefore, the goal of the broker when applying portfolio theory, to
increase the number of holdings in a portfolio in an effort not only
to reduce the aggregate portfolio risk but also to identify the risky

72. Bines, supra note 2, at 786.
73. BREALEY, supra note 61, at 88-103; see Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, The Adjustment
of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT'L ECON. REv. 1, 1 (1969).
74. Pozen, supra note 13, at 933.

75. Bines, supra note 2, at 789 n.217; see also Cragg & Malkiel, The Consensus andAccuracy
of Some Predictions of the Growth of Corporate Earnings, 23 J. FIN. 67 (1968).
76. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1615.
77. Id.
78. Note, Fiduciary Standardsand the Prudent Man Rule Under the Employment Retire-

ment Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HARv. L. Rv. 960, 970-71 (1975).
79.

This is the reduction of nonmarket risk. See infra notes 85-103 and accompanying

text; see also Bines, supra note 2, at 794.
80.

Pozen, supra note 13, at 940.
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portfolio which is the optimal or promises the highest overall return
per unit of risk. 8 '
Diversification results from the interplay of three elements: (1) the
number of different holdings; (2) the proportions in which different
securities are held; and (3) the extent to which the securities held react

in a dissimilar fashion to the same future contingencies. 82 Significant
diversification increases with relatively few stocks: such increases

diminish with additional stocks above a certain number.83 Major
empirical studies have been conducted and all have agreed that, for

the small or average investor, the best portfolio of risky assets is likely
to hold no more than twenty different securities.8 4
One method85 commonly used to attain efficient diversification
involves a division of all the risks of a security into two elementsalpha and beta coefficients.86 Alpha or nonmarket risk is related to
that part of the price variation of a security attributable to the particular business of the issuer. 7 Beta or market risk is defined as that
portion of the price variation of a security attributable to the price
movements of the stock market as a whole.88 Generally, beta risk
will rise or fall with an equivalent rise or fall in the stock market.8 9
Alpha risk will rise if the returns in the business
are favorable and
90
fall if business declines for some reason.
In order to calculate beta risk, one looks to the historical relationship of changes in the return of a security or a portfolio to changes

in the return of the stock market. 9 ' The beta level of the portfolio
81. SHtPE, supra note 47, at 69-73.
82. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1613.
83. Evans & Archer, Diversification and Reduction of Dispersion:An EmpiricalAnalysis,
23 J. FIN. 761, 767 (1968); Fisher & Lorie, Some Studies of Variability of Returns of Investments
in Common Stocks, 43 J. Bus. 99, 109-34 (1970); BREALEY, supra note 61, at 124-28; see also
Lorie, Diversification Old and New, I J. PORTFOLIO McmT. 25, 27 (Winter 1975).
84. COHEN, ZINBURG & ZEIKEL, supra note 59, at 614-25.
85. Pozen, supra note 13, at 942-43. Harry Markowitz developed the first approach to
portfolio diversification which was modified and simplified by William Sharpe. See Markowitz,
supra note 47, at 78-91; SHARPE, supra note 47, at 58-73; Sharpe, A Simplified Model for
Portfolio Analyses, 9 MGMT. Sci. 277 (1963).
86. Sharpe, Risk, Market Sensitivity and Diversification, in LORDS & BREA EY, supra note
13, at 347.
87. Id. at 342.
88. CotHoN, ZnB AG & ZEIKEL, supra note 59, at 769-70. Beta tends to rise when the
market rises and to fall when the market falls. LoRiE & BREAiEY, supra note 13, at 342.
89. COHEN, ZINBARO & ZEIKEL, supra note 59, at 760.
90. LoRIE & BREALEY, supra note 13, at 342.
91. Beta risk is calculated in different ways. For more information discussing actual computations, see Jensen, Capital Markets: Theories and Evidence, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MrMT.
Sci., 357, 369-71 (1972); see also LogiE & BREAY, supra note 13, at 342-44, 346. The use
of historical returns in the estimation of beta risk does not cause the traditional problems of
randomness or unreliability because beta coefficients are not subject to random walk findings.
Future returns are statistically independent of historical returns.
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then may be adjusted to meet the investment objective.92 The
appropriate beta level may be selected by combining the best portfolio of risky assets with risk-free assets or borrowed funds. 9 Beta,
when used with a diversified portfolio as distinguished from individual
securities, has been a reliable factor in predicting future associations
between portfolio returns and market returns. 94
The alpha risk of a portfolio may be eliminated without affecting
returns through perfect diversification of a securities portfolio since
it is not correlated to the price movements of other securities. 95 Beta
risk then becomes the total risk of a diversified portfolio. 96 Because
beta risk is defined as the degree to which each security reacts in
the same way as all other securities, one cannot reduce it by diversification without reducing returns. 97 Since beta or market risk represents
the total risk of the portfolio, evaluation of the investment risk of
the total portfolio need only be compared with that of the stock market
as a whole. 9
In summary, the approach that is most often used towards efficient diversification divides risk into alpha and beta risk. 99 A perfectly
diversified portfolio will eliminate alpha risk, leaving the measurement of risk of the portfolio based on market performance or beta
risk. Thus, the portfolio will fall and rise with the market and is
therefore said to be as risky as the stock market with a beta of 1.0.'" °
The beta level then may be adjusted above or below 1.0 to accommodate the desired investment objectives."'
Portfolios with betas that are greater than 1.0 rise proportionately
higher than the stock market when the market is rising, and fall pro10 2
portionately lower than the stock market when it is declining.
Portfolios containing betas less than 1.0 rise proportionately less than
92.

The adjustment of the beta level is based on Sharpe's "Separation Theorem." For

a more detailed description, see SARPE, supra note 47, at 70-73, 251-55.

93.

Sharpe's method for decreasing beta risk has been criticized for assuming that risk-

free assets exist. See Pozen, supra note 13, at 946. For a discussion of this problem and its

solution, see Cohen, supra note 16, at 1619. United States bonds and insured savings accounts
may be subject to some kind of risk due to inflation, but this is deemed insignificant.
94.

Pozen, supra note 13, at 950; see CoHEN, ZINBARr & ZEIKEL, supra note 59, at 825-32

(criticism of the beta concept).
95.

Bines, supra note 2, at 752-53.

96. Id.
97. Id.at 753.
98.

Pozen, supra note 13, at 943.

99.

The Markowitz method for portfolio diversification has been criticized as too costly.

Therefore, scholars suggested brokers use this method sparingly. See Pozen, supra note 13, at 942.
100. Loam & HAMILTON, supra note 47, at 188-89.

101. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text for an example of how to make the
adjustment.
102. Pozen, supra note 13, at 943.
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the market and, when the market is in a downswing, fall proportionately less than the stock market.'1 3 As a result, portfolios which
possess betas greater than 1.0 are considered riskier than the stock
market. Those containing betas below 1.0 are less risky than the
market.
Based on the above, one can readily see that portfolio theory actually
defines and delineates specific guidelines for proper investment management while satisfying the realistic expectations and desires of investors.
Whether or not portfolio theory is a more appropriate medium for
defining suitability standards than present approaches now will be
explored.
PORTFOLIO THEORY AND THE SUITABILITY DOCTRINE
As discussed previously, current legal approaches to suitability,
including those formulated by the NASD and NYSE, are replete with
broad, vague prohibitions against brokers recommending securities
which are not suited to the particular investment needs of the individual
customer. No specific suitability guidelines have been set forth to direct
brokers to the proper investment approach that they should pursue
with each individual customer. Instead, their investment advice is
judged on an ad hoc basis with the use of legal standards which seem
to measure investment performance in terms of diligence or prudence.' 0 4
Thus, the pure legal approaches to suitability offer no more than amorphous standards in interpreting the adequacy of the broker's investment recommendations to his client.
Portfolio theory, on the other hand, sets out specific guidelines for
assembling a portfolio that achieves the highest returns possible for
a client's individual risk level."'O Economic analysis proves to be a
better guide to regulating risk, not only because risk is defined in
more realistic terms as far as the customer's desires, but also because
0 6
risk may be measured with some consistent reliability.
The legal concept of risk focuses only on the avoidance of risk
of loss.' 0 7 This approach is concerned only with the possibility of the
investment selling for less than cost rather than with the possible further
values of the investment.' 8 The economic approach, however, sees
the risk of a portfolio as the uncertainty associated with its market
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
105. LrrNER, supra note 54, at 152-53; see also W. SHAr E, supra note 47, at 69-73.
106.

See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.

107.
108.

Cohen, supra note 16, at 1608.
Note, supra note 10, at 617.
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value or expected rate of return at some future date.' 9 Thus, if a
portfolio is subject to a sizeable variance in possible future values
on a certain date, and no one value has a high level of probability,
the portfolio is considered to be riskier than if all possible prices were
subject to a slight variance and one possible price was highly
probable." ' Hence, one portfolio might be riskier than another, even
though it has a lower probability of loss."' The economic approach
emphasizes how simplistic the present view of risk of loss is since
this view, represented by the legal approach, concentrates only on
future values of a portfolio which are less than cost." 2
Portfolio theory, on the other hand, considers every possible future
value, concentrating on and measuring what the investor is primarily
concerned with-the future value of his portfolio. Portfolio theory
realistically reflects the customer's desires and is more suitable for
meeting the customer's needs in that it defines risk not solely in terms
of loss, but in regard to future value.
Portfolio theory is more realistic in measuring risk than legal theory.
The economic concept of risk or portfolio theory concerns itself with
the relationship between the risk of a particular security and risk of
the portfolio as a whole." 3 Individual risk levels of securities cannot
be judged in a vacuum as is done under legal theory, since the risk
of the portfolio is the aggregate of the risks of securities that compose it.' The economic approach realistically notes that the risk level
of an entire portfolio must be judged, since the addition or removal
of individual securities from the portfolio will affect the total risk
of the portfolio. This shift may not necessarily be in accordance with
the individual risk level of a security.
Portfolio theory also realistically reflects that investment decisions
are made with regard to two factors: one, expected return, and the
other, risk." 5 Legal approaches are concerned exclusively with risk
of loss, and as a result, fail in three ways. First, exclusive concentration on the avoidance of risk of loss provides no incentive for the
broker to search for a possible way of increasing probable returns
for any given level of risk. Second, the legal approaches fail to note
that a larger than expected return often may offset the marginal risk

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 618.
Id. at 618-19.
Id. at 619.
Id.
Cohen, supra note 16, at 1609.
114. LINiTtER, supra note 54, at 152-53.
115. Roach II, supra note 29, at 1161.
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a security adds to a portfolio. Third, these approaches do not take
into consideration that many times an investor will be more concerned
with returns and less so about risk and, therefore, would be willing
to make a riskier investment with a higher probability of return. In
general, legal approaches cater only to an investment conservatism
which may not alvays be the realistic desire of a client.
Portfolio theory also provides guidelines for finding portfolios at
any specific individual risk level which will offer the highest return
in regard to the degree of risk the particular customer is willing to
bear." 6 No legal theory has calculated or has attempted to calculate
the customer's preference for risk in regard to return. Portfolio does
17
so and does it with a certain amount of accuracy and reliability.'
In summary, legal approaches have failed miserably, not only in
erroneously assuming what the customer's needs and desires are, but also
in not requiring the broker-dealer to use methods that are effective
in promoting investment returns. Suitability, then, must not be measured
in these terms. Suitability, however, should be measured in terms of
portfolio theory. As has been shown, the theory precisely and
realistically defines customer preferences and expectations, adjusting
these preferences to conform with an accurately calculated degree of
individual risk which in turn generates the highest return in accordance with such risk.
Portfolio theory, though, is only as good as the methods used to
promote it. Therefore, if suitability is to be defined in terms of portfolio theory, the underlying methods used in achieving the highest
expected return for a particular level of risk must be suitable as well.
Two procedures have been tried in accomplishing this goal: one method
attempts to increase future returns while the other attempts to reduce
risk." 8 The method which focuses on predicting future returns uses
various research methods such as technical and/or fundamental
analysis, to find undervalued securities. However, all efforts used to
predict returns have been unreliable. Therefore, the purchase of
research should not be used in calculating the highest expected return
per unit of risk.' '"The second method, efficient diversification, should
be used instead, since it meets the portfolio objective by reducing
overall risk.'°
116. The application of portfolio theory does have some problems. The major problem,
identification of the optimal portfolio of risky assets, may be solved if the ECMH is adopted
as a necessary corollary to portfolio theory in any suitability standard. See Cohen, supra note
16, at 1617-25 (problems and solutions surrounding the application of portfolio theory).
117. Id. at 1609, 1629.
118. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
119. Loam & HAMILTON, supra note 47, at 79; Bines, supra note 2, at 789 n.217.
120. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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Based on the preceding discussion, a new definition of suitability
should be framed, and portfolio theory is more than adequate for
fulfilling this role. Therefore, in making investment decisions, brokers
should try to achieve the greatest expected return available at
individually suitable levels of risk. As a necessary corollary to the
new definition of suitability, portfolio theory must attempt to reduce
risk instead of trying to use very unreliable methods of research to
predict future returns. Diversification must be used properly to reduce
nonmarket risk, while leaving market risk remaining. Adjustment of
market risk can then be made to meet the investor's investment
objectives. Economic theory, however, is at odds with the disclosure
policy of the SEC.
SUITABILITY STANDARDS: EFFICIENT CAPITAL

MARKET HYPOTHESIS AND PORTFOLIO THEORY

WITH RESPECT TO SEC DISCLOSURE POLICY

Searching economic and legal theories in order to discover concrete
guidelines in which a proper suitability doctrine can be formulated
has led to a significant observation with respect to the nature of
suitability and the SEC present method of disclosure. If economic
theory were to be adopted in formulating suitability standards, a major
conflict would arise between the new doctrine and current disclosure
policy. This conflict results from the fact that current economic thinking utilizes in its variables the definition of information that is not
the same as authorized under SEC disclosure policy.' 2 '
In their endeavor to establish concrete criteria by which to judge
suitability standards, some members of the legal community recently
have turned to theories advanced by economists which undertake to
measure securities performance in the market and to study the factors influencing their performance. One economic theory widely studied
is the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) which is meeting
growing acceptance by security analysts. 2 In general, the ECMH
basically examines market functioning and draws conclusions as to
the efficiency of the American capital markets.' 2 3 The ECMH

121. See generally Pickholz & Horahan III, The SEC's Version of the Efficient Market
Theory and Its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943 (1982);
Saari, The Efficient CapitalMarket Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the
Securites Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031 (1977).
122. See B. LEv, FINANCIAL STATE~iNT ANALYsis: A NEW APPROACH, at 212-25 (1974);
Fama, supra note 64; LoRm & HAWLTON, supra note 47, at 97 (excellent background on this
theory).
123. Saari, supra note 121, at 1031.
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postulates that the market absorbs all relevant and available information with respect to the future financial position of companies
resulting in the immediate adjustment of stock prices. '2
In contrast, the SEC attempts to regulate the dissemination of
information through its disclosure policies. The function of the federal
securities laws has evolved from a primary concern with proper allocation of financial resources,' 5 to an overwhelming emphasis on the
protection of the individual investor.' 2 6 To achieve this protection,
the SEC has structured rules and regulations in such a manner as
to regulate the type of information that may be disclosed to investors
as well as the manner in which it is disseminated.' 2 7 The function
of the SEC is to assure that this information reaches individual laypersons for use by them in making informed investment decisions.
The SEC believes that in order to protect the investing public fully,
information necessary in making an informed investment decision must
be made equally available to all potential investors. 2 ' To achieve the

goal of egalitarian disclosure, the SEC has attempted to regulate and
direct the flow of useful information so that it is available to and
comprehensible by all investors.' 9 The ECMH, however, raises serious
doubts about the utility of the information required or regulated by

the current policies of the SEC. With respect to this conflict, the
following section will examine the operation of the ECMH and its

utility with portfolio theory in formulating a standard for suitability.
A.

Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis Defined

The ECMH evolved from studies by both the mathematics and
economics professions regarding the process of price determination
in the securities market.'

30

Empirical studies have tested the ECMH

124. LoRiu & HAMILTON, supra note 47, at 97; see also Hellwig, On the Aggregation of
Information in Competitive Markets, 22 J. ECON. THEORY 477, 477 (1980); BAsu, Investment
Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to Their Price Earnings Ratios: A Test of the
Efficient Market Hypotheses, 32 J. FIN. 663, 663 (1977).
125. "[W]hatever may be the full catalogue of the forces that brought to pass the present
depression, not least among these has been the wanton misdirection of the capital resources
of the Nation." H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1933).
126. SEC, THE WORK OF THE SECURITIEs AND ExcHANGE COMMISSION at vii (1974).
127. The primary provisions regarding the disclosure of information are: 1933 Securities
Act §§5, 6, 7, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§77e, 77f, 77g, 77j (1970); 1934 Securities Act §§5, 6, 12, 13,
15 U.S.C. §78e (1970), 15 U.S.C. §78f (Supp. V 1975), §78(i)-(m) (Supp. V 1975), 15 U.S.C.
§78m, as amended by 15 U.S.C. §78m(f) (Supp. V 1975); 1934 Securities Act §14, 15 U.S.C.
§78n (1970). The primary provisions regarding the regulation of inside trading are the 1934
Securities Act §§10b, 16, and Rule lob-5.
128. SAAm, supra note 121, at 1032-33.
129. See supra note 127.
130. See generally Fama, supra note 64; LORIE & HAMILTON, supra note 47.

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
in three forms, known as the weak, semi-strong, and strong. Each
form varies with respect to the type of information studied and the
effect on market efficiency.
The weak form concentrates on the effect, if any, that information
regarding past price movements has on current stock prices in the
market. The weak form asserts that there is no relation between past
price movements and future stock prices.' Through empirical research
it was determined that security price movements
essentially are ran32
dom, having little discernable pattern.'
The ECMH in weak form has a direct bearing on the use of portfolio theory as a standard of suitability. Portfolio theory indicated
that the rational investor (or his broker) should maximize the amount
of return per unit of risk on the risky portfolio. There are two general
ways in which this may be accomplished. First, as noted above, the
investor can diversify his holdings.' 3 3 Second, he can attempt to purchase securities which are undervalued by the market. 3 4 However,
if all information about any given security at any particular time is
reflected in the price of the security, it would be impossible to identify and acquire undervalued securities.' 3 5
If the ECMH accurately describes reality and undervalued securities
do not exist, an investor seeking to maximize the return per unit of
risk only could have one course of action, diversification. Once the
portfolio is efficiently diversified, a search for undervalued securities
should be futile.'3 6 In terms of suitability standards, the broker would
perforce have to apply this rationale and apply diversification pursuant to the circumstances of his customer. Any other recommendation could produce an "unsuitable" result, should portfolio theory
in this form be adopted as a standard.
The semi-strong form of the ECMH concentrates on the effect that
the release of new public information has on stock prices. ' The semistrong form asserts that securities prices react extremely rapidly and

131. Note, supra note 39, at 1090.
132. Fama, supra note 47, at 389-400; see also Fama, supra note 66, at 56-57.
133. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
135. Alexander, Price Movements in Speculative Markets-Trends or Random Walks, 5
INDus. MG r. REv. 25 (Spring 1964); see also Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets,
and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. Rav. 135, 178 (1984).
136. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1612-13.
137. The public information studied pertained to changes in accounting methods, stock splits,
annual reports and new security issues. See Ball, Changes in Accounting Technique and Stock
Prices, 10 J. AccT. RPsEAtc I (Supp. 1972); Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, supra note 73;
Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411
(1961); Sunder, Relationships Between Accounting Charges and Stock Prices: Problems of
Measurement and Some EmpiricalEvidence, 11 J. ACCT. REsEA~cH 138 (Supp. 1973); Sunder,
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in an impartial manner to public information. 38' Additionally, empirical
studies on the semi-strong form of the ECMH discovered that the
market reacted to public information before it was announced
' This is explained by virtue of how an efficient market
formally. 39
works. It is constantly absorbing all information, whether or not it
is released through the formal disclosure system.' 0 Further studies
revealed that the market reflects actual changes in the financial condition of corporations, regardless of misleading or confusing financial statements that were released to the public.' 4
The third form of the ECMH is the strong form. It stands for
the proposition that the market reacts rapidly to both public and nonpublic information.' 2 To validate this proposition, researchers have
studied whether it is possible for investors to have access to nonpublic information and, if so, whether this information has been used
by them to reap returns which are considered to be above average. '
It was found that two groups of investors, corporate insiders and
New York Stock Exchange specialists, have been able to achieve slightly
superior results through access to inside information."'
In summary, empirical studies of the weak and semi-strong form
of the ECMH have served to validate the theory of market efficiency.
There has been, however, some deviation from strong-form efficiency,
since two groups of investors reaped better results due to some market
inefficiency. Additionally, it has been found in all three forms that
the market analyzes and subsumes rapidly all information, whether
or not it is released through the formal SEC disclosure system.' 5 The
three forms of the ECMH, moreover, all demonstrate that the SEC
disclosure policy is inadequate.
Stock Price and Risk Related to Accounting Changes in Inventory Valuation, 50 ACCT. REv.

305 (1975).
138. LoUE & HrAmLToN, supra note 47, at 83-87.
139. Ball & Brown, An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers, 6 J. ACCT.
RESEARCH 159, 168-71 (1968).
140. SAAI, supra note 121, at 1048.
141. Sunder, supra note 137, at 314.
142. LEv, supra note 68, at 217-18, 220.
143. SAARi, supra note 121, at 1050-54.
144. See Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410 (1974); Jaffe, The
Effect of Regulation on Insider Trading, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 93 (1974); Lorie &
Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Propertiesof Insider Trading, 11 J. L. & EcoN. 35
(1968); Niederhoffer & Hosborne, Market Making and Reversal on the Stock Exchange, 61 J. Aml.
STATISICAL A. 879 (1959).
145. Studies show that all information is reflected in stock prices, not just that which is
disseminated pursuant to the SEC disclosure rules and regulations. Other sources of information besides SEC-mandated statements are trade papers, government reports, statements by cor-

porate officials, and public and private sector reports on the economy. See SAUi, supra note
121, at 1054.
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B. ECMH and Portfolio Theory-The Conflict with
Disclosure Policy
Three considerations become evident after discussing the ECMH
in its three forms. First, the ECMH should be viewed as a necessary
corollary of portfolio theory; if it is decided that portfolio theory
should be made a part of any suitability standard, the ECMH should
be included as well.' 6 Second, the attempt to integrate the ECMH
into a legal suitability standard would be in conflict with the current
SEC disclosure system. Third, the ECMH points out that the SEC
goal of informing the investor through its present disclosure rules is
inadequate.
The ECMH should be integrated into any standard of suitability
since it is a necessary corollary to portfolio theory. The objective of
portfolio theory is the maximization of the amount of return per unit
of risk on the risky portfolio.' 7 There are two possible procedures
which could be used for achieving this objective. They are the purchase of undervalued securities and the diversification of holdings.
The ECMH supports the position taken by other studies previously
mentioned that maximization of returns through use of securities
research to find undervalued securities is fruitless." 8 The ECMH stands
for the proposition that diversification should be instituted as a method
for selecting securities, since any attempts made by brokers at discover' It has, in fact, been
ing undervalued securities would be futile. 49
vigorously argued before that the ECMH should be integrated into
a suitability standard.' 50
The integration of the ECMH into a suitability standard, however,
leads to a discussion of a second consideration. It is posited that any
attempt to integrate the ECMH into a suitability standard would create
a paradox in that its adoption would be in conflict with the adoption
by the SEC of an integrated disclosure system in 1982.'1'
It has been said that when the SEC adopted this new system, it

146. As to why portfolio theory should be included in any kind of suitability rule, see
supra notes 104-20 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
148. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1614-15.

149.

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.

150. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1612-17, 1632-33.
151. The integrated disclosure system essentially involves the combination of the disclosure
requirements of the 1934 Act with those of the 1933 Act. SEC Securities Act Release No.
6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982), reprinted in [1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer

Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

72,328 (Mar. 3, 1982); see also Greene, Determining

the Responsibilitiesof UnderwritersDistributing Securities Within an Integrated Disclosure System,
56 NoTRE Da4 LAw. 755 (1981).
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also had adopted the ECMH.' 52 There is in fact some acknowledgment of the ECMH by the SEC. The integrated disclosure system
has streamlined disclosure requirements in recognition that all market
information, whether or not SEC mandated disclosure information
(e.g., periodic reports), is disseminated rapidly and reflected immediately
in the price of securities.' 5 3 Streamlining has occurred mainly through
the tool of incorporation by reference.' 5 4
Recognition by the SEC of the ECMH has only been partial,
however.'5 It has been said that the ECMH has been adopted only
in form and not in substance.' 56 This conclusion is valid in that if
the ECMH were recognized fully, the SEC streamlined disclosure provisions would be available to all issuers. This is not the case.' 57 It
has been posited that the Commission largely has accepted the efficient market theory only for that strata of issuers that the Commission believes are most likely to have securities that behave in the manner suggested by the theory.' 58 Another indication that the SEC only
partially has recognized the ECMH is that the tool of incorporation
by reference goes against efficient market theory. It injects useless
information into the prospectus that already has been absorbed by
59
the market.
Other SEC policies also belie the idea that the ECMH has adopted.
Long form registration under S-1, which does not even permit incorporation by reference, is still very much alive. 60 Further, certain
liability provisions under the securities laws are not in line with the
so-called adoption of the ECMH by the SEC. This can be seen particularly in the area of projections, where not all forward-looking
information is protected by the current SEC safe harbor rule on
projections.' 6' Additionally, liability provisions with respect to underwriter due diligence requirements are in conflict with the efficient
market theory. 62 Other areas of the law that appear to be in conflict
152. Banoff, supra note 135, at 138 n.13.
153. Id. at 138.
154. Release No. 6383, supra note 151, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,382 n.9, reprintedin [1937-1982
Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328 at 62,993 n.9.
155. Pickholz & Horahan, supra note 121, at 944-45.
156. Id. at 944-56.
157. Banoff, supra note 135, at 139.
158. Pickholz & Horahan, supra note 121, at 954; see also Greene, supra note 151, at 759
n.23, 783.
159. Pickholz & Horahan, supra note 121, at 949-50.
160. 17 C.F.R. §239.11 (1983).
161. Only three categories of forward-looking statements are covered by the rule. A projection falling into one of the categories will be protected only if certain requirements are met,
such as good faith or reasonable basis. Sec. Act Rel. 6084, 17 SEC Dock. 1048 (1979); see
also Rule 175, Securities Act of 1933.
162. Pickholz & Horahan, supra note 121, at 952.
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with the ECMH are the liabilities provisions under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities law.' 3 In summary, the SEC still prohibits or slows down the dissemination of certain information. The
ECMH, however, recognizes that all information is absorbed
immediately into the market, regardless of SEC regulations.
This discussion leads to the third and final consideration. The current SEC disclosure system is inadequate because it does not effectively do what it proposes to do-regulate information disseminated
to the public. As mentioned above, the market receives information
immediately despite SEC efforts to slow down or prohibit its dissemination. This conclusion results from the application of the ECMH.
Acknowledgment by the SEC of the paradox created in the second
consideration must lead to a choice of one of two alternatives. Either
the SEC will maintain its current disclosure policy or it will integrate
the ECMH in its entirety into a suitability standard and thereby adjust
its disclosure requirements accordingly. The consequences of a decision not to integrate the ECMH would be numerous. First, it would
be likely that economic theory would have little, if any, impact on
suitability standards. Without the application of the ECMH, portfolio theory would be virtually useless. As discussed above, the ECMH
assures that the maximization of returns under portfolio theory will
be accomplished through diversification rather than investment in
undervalued securities. Without the ECMH as a rule of suitability,
brokers may fail to diversify and investors may be charged unnecessary
costs which have resulted from futile attempts to discover undervalued
securities."6 4 Portfolio theory, therefore, would fail to work with any
regularity and would not be suitable, by itself, as a method of selecting securities.
Even if diversification were chosen by brokers as a method to maximize returns, efficient diversification may not be achieved without
regard to the ECMH. The ECMH not only necessitates diversification, but also calls for efficient diversification.' 6 The ECMH states,
and market reality confirms, that diversification results from the
analysis of all information, not just information mandated by the
SEC. Without the ECMH as a rule of suitability, brokers likely would
be compelled out of a fear of being sanctioned by the SEC only to
163. See generally Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Model: A Recipe for the
Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 373 (1984).
164. Even if undervalued securities existed, the costs incurred by a broker (and charged
to the investor) in locating such securities through fundamental or technical analysis probably
would not be offset through superior returns. SAAiu, supra note 121, at 1054-55.
165. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1620-21.

1985 / Suitability Standards
use information permitted by the SEC in diversifying an investment
portfolio. Without efficient diversification through the ECMH,
66
expected returns would vary for portfolios at the same risk level.'
It therefore would be impossible, under portfolio theory, to define
the optimal portfolio of risky assets.' 67 Portfolio theory without the
ECMH would be rendered useless. Denial of the ECMH as a standard of suitability leads to the refusal to recognize economic theory
as a whole in developing suitability standards.
The failure to integrate the ECMH into a standard of suitability
leads to a second major consequence-the failure of the SEC to
recognize market reality. According to the ECMH, prices of securities
in the market reflect all information about the securities, whether or
not that information is permitted by SEC disclosure laws.' 68 Regulation by the SEC in this area, however, has been ineffective. Prohibited
or nonmandated SEC information is absorbed by the market regardless
of SEC regulations. This has been primarily due to the fact that the
purpose behind SEC disclosure laws is not in alignment with economic
reality.
The primary purpose behind SEC disclosure laws is the protection
of investors by providing equal access to all information useful in
valuing securities.' 69 By prohibiting the disclosure of certain types of
information,' 70 or by attempting to slow down the informational
process through mandating repetitive disclosure' 7 ' or long-form
disclosure,' 72 the SEC assumes not all information pertaining to
securities is valuable in making an investment decision.' 73 This assumption, however, is in direct contradiction to market reality, where all
information is deemed to be valuable. This is proven by the fact that
all information pertaining to any security is reflected in the price of
a security at any given moment.' 74
The failure to recognize market reality leads to the third and final
consequence-unequal access to investment information. Though the
primary goal behind SEC disclosure rules has been egalitarian access,
the SEC has defeated its own purpose by failing to recognize market
166. Id. ECMH posits that all portfolios that are efficiently diversified and have the same
degree of risk will have the same expected return.
167. Id.
168. This has been proven in the semi-strong form of the ECMH. See supra notes 137-41
and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
173. SAAm, supra note 121, at 1063.
174. LoRi & HAMILTON, supra note 122, at 97.
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reality completely. By attempting to prohibit or slow down the
dissemination of certain information, the SEC is promoting unequal
access to those investors whose only source of information is that
which is permissible under the SEC rules.1 71 The SEC clearly must
amend the disclosure rules to reflect market realities.
C. Adjustment of Disclosure Policy to Accommodate
Economic Theory
The failure to integrate the ECMH and portfolio theory into
suitability standards has resounding consequences and is, in fact, an
untenable position. The question then becomes how the SEC should
adjust its disclosure rules to recognize economic reality fully, accommodating the inclusion of the ECMH and portfolio theory into its
suitability rules.
While some investors make their own investment decisions without
first consulting a broker, the vast majority rely on the services of
a broker before investing. 176 This phenomenon may be due to the
way information is presented in SEC documents. Boiler-plate provisions and financial statements which are extremely sophisticated and
incomprehensible by the untrained investor are contained in such
documents. A typical prospectus usually cannot enable a lay investor
to achieve an informed investment decision. This is true regardless
of the changes made under the integrated disclosure system.' Much
of the information which is now incorporated by reference into the
prospectus under the new system is sophisticated information contained in annual and periodic reports. Because of the naivete of the
average investor, it is assumed that he will rely heavily on his broker's
expertise in making the right investment decisions. '7 However, it has
been recognized that the layman will only benefit from the broker's
knowledge if the broker is working in an efficient market. 17 9
The current SEC disclosure policy is little help in enabling brokers
to give their investor customers full and complete information. It is
not completely in tune with market reality and only allows partial
175.
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dissemination of market information. The SEC, in effect, has put
the broker in an extremely precarious position. By virtue of the current legal suitability requirements, responsibility for making inappropriate investment decisions has been shifted from the customer
to the broker. This is due to the belief of the Commission that the
"disclosure requirements and practices alone have not been wholly
effective in protecting the investor.""'8 The Commission, therefore,
places a heavy burden on brokers without allowing them the means
to fully support the weight."'
The solution must be either to allow the prospectus and other SEC
documents to reflect all information in the efficient market or to
develop a two-tier disclosure approach. The SEC has been aware of
past demand for two types of disclosure documents, which are needed
to adequately inform both individuals and their market represent82
atives. 1
It has been suggested by one securities scholar that the disclosure
policy be directed toward the representatives of market participants:
brokers make the vast majority of investment decisions for the lay
investor and are the best qualified persons to do so.'"' What may
be needed "is a new departure, with disclosure oriented towards the
sophisticated person able to handle it, through whom suggestions for
action will filter down to the layperson."' 8 This "departure" would
entail an administrative recognition that, although current disclosure
documents such as the prospectus are intended for the unsophisticated
investor, the theory that the prospectus can be and is utilized by the
lay investor is a myth.' 85 A new SEC disclosure policy geared to market
professionals would allow them to function in an efficient market
by giving them access to all available information.
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CONCLUSION

The SEC needs to go further in establishing a more meaningful
disclosure policy for brokers and other market representatives. The
new policy should more closely resemble true market needs, whether
or not that policy is contained in a one- or two-tier approach.
Disclosure documents geared to market professionals should reflect
all market information in accordance with the ECMH. If the
proposition of the ECMH is accepted, that is, if all available market
information is reflected in the price of any given security at any one
time, then portfolio theory would mandate diversification to maximize
returns. A suitability standard predicated on these theories would
encompass all market information.
If a suitability theory could be aligned with this meaningful disclosure
policy, both the professional and layman would benefit. The market
professional could be judged pursuant to guidelines which are concrete, yet encompass realities of everyday market functioning. Laymen,
the majority of which seek the professional's advice, would profit
by receiving investment recommendations that have been derived
through studies of an efficient market system.

